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EUROPEAN CLASS ACTIONS
Michelle Parsons*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have meant new and exciting renovations to the laws in 
European countries, as many countries introduced their first group action 
legislation. Though varying in scope and form, these actions have presented 
the opportunities for plaintiffs to bundle their claims and bring collective 
actions before the court. However, the changes are far from finished and the 
area of class actions is in an exciting period of expansion. These developments 
have spurred greater interest in the topic, and some European countries have 
looked to the United States as a guide for what to emulate or avoid in class 
action legislation. The following paper provides a general review of US class 
action law today, with an evaluation of its positive and negative attributes.
Then, the article undertakes a more detailed assessment of collective claims in 
several European countries, as well as a glance at the projected future for 
European class actions as a whole. 
II. UNITED STATES
Class actions began in the United States with the 1938 adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The law was “an invention of equity, 
allowing certain groups of individuals with common interests to enforce their 
rights in a single suit.”2 The use of class actions did not develop with any 
consistency; however, until the 1966 amendment of Rule 23, the federal class 
action rule.3 Coinciding with the growth of civil rights, some felt the 
amendment itself was targeted at social reform.4 Others felt it targeted the 
business community, making it vulnerable to more devastating suits at the 
hands of consumers.5 In the 1980s, US courts began to expand the types of 
                                                                
* Attorney, SC Office of the Attorney General, JD & MPA, University of South 
Carolina, 2007. Ms. Parsons would like to thank Professor Nathan Crystal for all of his 
assistance with this article, as well as the hardworking staff of the South Carolina 
Journal of International Law & Business.
1 Linda A. Willett, US-Style Class Actions in Europe: A Growing Threat?, 9 
NAT’L LEGAL CENTER FOR PUB.INT. 1, 2 (2005). 
2 Id. at 2-3 (quoting Edward F. Sherman, American Class Actions: Significant 
Features and Developing Alternatives in Foreign Legal Systems, 215 F.R.D. 130, 132 
(2003)).
3 Id. at 3.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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suits that qualify for class actions in an effort to lessen the burden that the 
individual suits would have on the courts.6 The use of class actions has 
steadily increased from this time until the present day.
In a US class action, one or more individuals may represent a larger 
group of people with similar claims by bringing a suit on their behalf.7 Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) outlines the following prerequisites applicable to 
all types of class actions:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims and defenses of the class, and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.8
While a class must meet these prerequisites in order to be certified as 
a class action, it must also meet additional standards.9 Under Rule 23(b), three 
types of class actions are recognized:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the class would create a risk of
a. inconsistent or varying adjudications with 
respect to individual members of the class 
which would establish incompatible standards 
of conduct for the party opposing the class; or
b. adjudications with respect to individual 
members of the class which would as a 
practical matter be dispositive of the interests 
of the other members not parties to the 
adjudications or substantially impair or 
impeded their ability to protect their interests; 
or
                                                                
6 Id. at 4.
7 Id.
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
9 Id. at 23(b).
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(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby 
making appropriate final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class 
as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common 
to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a 
class action is superior to other available methods for 
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.10
In determining whether the questions of law or fact of the class 
predominate over the questions of the individual class members, Rule 23 
instructs the court to consider the following: the level of interest that 
individual class members would have in individually controlling their suit, the 
extent to which the controversy is already being litigated by or against 
individuals within the class, the desirability or lack thereof of litigating all of 
the claims in one forum, and the difficulties that may arise in the management 
of the class action.11 Once these factors are weighed and the standards are met, 
the court may certify the action as a class by court order.12
However, all class members, including those who are absent, are 
bound by the judgment resulting from the suit.13 If members of the class do not 
wish to be bound by the suit and the suit is for monetary damages, these 
individuals must be given a chance to opt out of the suit and to bring an 
individual suit later.14
The contingency fee is one feature that distinguishes US class actions 
and has been part of the US system since the early nineteenth century.15 In this 
payment system, the lawyer’s fee is conditional on recovery of damages.16
However, the contingency fee can also result in a windfall to the plaintiff’s 
attorney; and many critics claim the contingency fee motivates class actions.17
Because lawyers claim up to 40% of the final award, critics argue that they are 
                                                                
10 Id.
11 Id. at 23(b)(3).
12 Id. at 23(c)(1)(A).
13 Willett, supra note 1, at 4.
14 Id.
15 Willett, supra note 1, at 9.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 9-10.
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able to fund speculative claims that would otherwise be financially risky.18
The increase in private securities class actions within the United States 
demonstrates the ability to take on more speculative cases.19 From 2003 to 
2005, these types of actions increased by 16%.20
The United States underwent substantial class action reform in 2005.
In February 2005, President George W. Bush signed a law aimed at deterring 
frivolous class actions, which he claimed inflated the cost of US legal fees, 
civil awards, and settlements nationwide to the sum of $240 billion per year.21
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 gave federal courts jurisdiction over 
any class action where the amount in controversy is in excess of $5 million 
and the defendant is from the same state as less than one-third of the 
plaintiffs.22 In addition, the Act “limits the recovery of contingent fees by 
attorneys in settlements where plaintiffs are awarded coupons, establishes 
guidelines that federal district courts are to follow before approving 
settlements, and specifies requirements for serving notice of proposed 
settlements on federal and state officials.”23
Many note ironically that the expansion of European class actions 
seems to coincide with the US measures to scale back the class action 
phenomena.24 A more in-depth examination of the expansion of class actions 
in Europe requires an assessment of individual countries. The remainder of 
this article will take a closer look at the status of class actions in the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France and Germany, while 
comparing them to each other, as well as the United States. The examination 
of Germany will focus on its recent implementation of an innovative collective 
claims system. Finally, the article will look at France, which has a collective 
claims system in place, but has begun the controversial step of pursuing a class 
action system similar to that of the United States.
                                                                
18 Bob Sherwood & Nikki Tait, Business Life The Professions: Class Actions 
Across the Atlantic, FIN. TIMES UK, June 16, 2005, at 4.
19  Lori Calabro, In Your Own Defense, CFO EUROPE.COM, May 2005, available at
http://www.cfoeurope.com/displayStory.cfm/3929323.
20 Id.
21 Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 4.
22 John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and the 
Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L. REV. 1021, 1033-34 (2005); See Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-002, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
23 Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 22, at n.61.
24 Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 3.
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III. UNITED KINGDOM
Representative actions have been available in the United Kingdom for 
over two hundred years, but claimants rarely used this type of action “due to 
‘narrow court interpretations’ and inapplicability to matters ‘where the sole 
relief sought damages that would have to be proved individually.’”25 Class 
actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief are increasingly more 
frequent in the United Kingdom; but expansion in collective action law has 
also enabled class action claimants to seek damages, broadening the use of 
collective actions overall.26
There are several methods of collective action in the United 
Kingdom.27 Parties with the same claim may join together.28 Further, when 
more than one party has the “same interest” in a claim, they may bring a 
representative action.29 Courts may order damages in representative actions 
where “(a) the class members’ loss can be readily ascertained at the time of 
judgment and (b) class members have waived their rights to individual receipt 
of damages and instead wish their compensation to be paid to a body that 
represents their interests.”30 Like the United States, these actions can be 
initiated without court permission.31 Unlike the United States, the courts do not 
closely supervise these actions and settlements do not usually require court 
approval.32 Representative actions are rare, in part because they require the 
relief sought to be beneficial to all represented claimants.33
The more common form of collective action is called a group 
action.34 Group actions can be compared to the Rule 23(b)(3) class actions of 
the United States, as they are discussed in the preceding section. Group actions 
occur “when there are multiple claimants and common issues of law or related 
                                                                
25 Willett, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting Edward F. Sherman, American Class 
Actions: Significant Features and Developing Alternatives in Foreign Legal Systems, 
215 F.R.D. 130, 174 (2003)).
26 Id. at 6-7.
27 Mark Clough & Arundel McDougall, The United Kingdom Report, at 7,  in 
DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR THE INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION LAW 
AS LAID DOWN IN ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/national_re
ports/united_kingdom_en.pdf (last visited on Feb. 6, 2007).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Willett, supra note 1, at 6.
31 Id. at 7.
32 Id.
33 Clough & McDougall, supra note 27, at 7.
34 Id.
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fact under a Group Litigation Order.”35 This form of litigation developed from 
the “European Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers,” 
passed by the European Parliament & Council in 2000.36 The Directive states 
that a representative must have “advanced determination of the right to serve 
as a representative rather than allowing the American or representative action 
‘self-selective approach.’”37 In further contrast to representative actions, the 
court strictly supervises group litigation orders.38 A senior judge must consent 
to the group litigation order (GLO) and the court may make a group litigation 
order whenever a number of claims possess shared or connected issues of fact 
or law.39 A GLO specifies the issues to which it applies and requires a group 
register of the claims that it governs.40 Group claims are transferred to the 
management court, which will also address any future GLO claims.41 Under 
GLOs, one or more of the claims are used as test cases and the others are 
delayed until further notice.42 Any judgment or order made regarding the 
group register claim is binding on the parties to all other claims, unless the 
court directs otherwise.43 From 2000 to mid 2005, since group litigation orders 
became available in the United Kingdom, forty-nine such suits have been 
registered.44
A plaintiff in the United Kingdom has several potential fee situations 
to examine prior to bringing suit. As in Canada and Australia, UK claimants 
must consider the “loser pays” rule.45 Analyzing the United Kingdom payment 
system, David Gold, a Herbert Smith senior partner, noted, “Where is the 
incentive for class actions? Unless you give lawyers real incentives to bring 
these class actions, they won’t happen.”46 The “loser pays” rule requires the 
party that settles or loses the case to pay the prevailing party’s legal 
expenses.47 In situations where legal aid funded the claimant’s case because 
                                                                
35 Id. (citing Civil Procedure Rule[hereinafter CPR] Part 19, Rule 19.11).
36 Willett, supra note 1, at 7.
37 Id. (quoting Edward F. Sherman, American Class Actions: Significant Features 
and Developing Alternatives in Foreign Legal Systems, 215 F.R.D. 130, 144 (2003)).
38 Clough & McDougall, supra note 27, at 7.
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. (citing CPR Rule 19.12(1)(a)).
44 Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 2.
45 Ted Allen, Interest in Class Actions Growing Outside the US, SCAS ALERT, 
June 2005, at 5, available at http://slw.issproxy.com/securities_litigation_blo 
/2005/06/the_state_of_fo.html (citing Peter Burbidge, law professor at Westminster 
University).
46 Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 4. 
47 Willett, supra note 1, at 11.
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the claimant would not have been able to pay the cost of potential loss, the rule 
is not applied.48 Additionally, the United Kingdom has a conditional fee 
system that translates to a “no-win-no-fee system with a success fee based on 
hours worked at a percentage uplift related to the risk but capped at 100%.”49
The United Kingdom’s legal system shares several features with the 
United States that are not common in the rest of Europe. While most of the 
European Union has banned lawyer advertising, the United Kingdom has 
permitted such advertising since the 1970s.50 Additionally, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Cyprus are alone in recognizing punitive damages,
“though they are rarely awarded.”51
Currently, securities class actions are a focal point of discussion in 
the United Kingdom. The UK law does not provide for securities class actions, 
but does allow investors to form associations that may bring suit against the 
company in question.52 In the UK, company directors do not have a legal 
obligation to their shareholders; rather, their legal obligation is to the 
company.53 Additionally, in April 2005, the UK Companies Act was amended 
to allow companies to indemnify directors against third-party claims.54
The recent Railtrack case illustrated the difficulties of bringing a 
class action in the United Kingdom. 55,000 former Railtrack investors raised 
£2.4 million to bring suit against government officials for misfeasance and 
damages to the shareholders’ interest due to the company’s collapse in 2001.55
The High Court stalled the case when it refused to limit the potential liability 
of the Railtrack shareholders to £1.35 million for defense legal bills under the 
loser pays system.56 Eventually, the plaintiffs lost the case when they failed to 
convince the High Court that the Transportation Secretary had acted with 
misfeasance.57 Thus, they were liable for attorney’s fees, demonstrating the 
high risk that must be weighed when deciding to pursue a class action in 
Europe.
                                                                
48 Id.
49 Id. at 10-11 (quoting Christopher Hodges, European Law Reform, Center for 
Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford, Wolfson College (Apr. 2004) at 2).
50 Id. at 14.
51 Michael Freedman, Abogados, Advokaters, Advocaten, FORBES, Dec. 27, 2004 
at 1.
52 Allen, supra note 45, at 5.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Defeat for Railtrack Shareholders, BBC NEWS, Oct. 14, 2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4340794.stm.
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IV. SWEDEN
Sweden was the first European Union country to introduce a class 
action equivalent to that of the United States.58 On January 1, 2003, Sweden 
introduced the Class Action Act.59 The Act allows the following group actions: 
private class actions, organizational class actions, and public class actions.60 A 
private class action may be initiated by any person or entity that is both a 
member of the class and has his own claim.61 The Swedish Government has 
proposed a potential elimination of this standing requirement so that 
individuals affected by situations such as competition law infringement could 
bring a suit where a party was injured without a contracting relationship with 
the infringing party.62
Organizational class actions occur when an organization brings a 
claim without having a claim of its own.63 Both consumer and labor 
organizations may bring these actions and they generally relate to suits 
between consumers and providers of goods and services.64
Public class actions develop when the Swedish Government appoints 
an authority to act as a plaintiff and litigate on behalf of an injured class.65 The 
government pursues these class actions when it appears that doing so would 
benefit the greater public interest.66 A government committee examining the 
issue proposed that the Competition Authority should not be granted 
permission to bring class actions because the public law system sanctions 
competition sufficiently; thus, such action would not contribute to the public
interest.67 Rather, the government decided that the Consumer Ombudsman and 
                                                                
58 Judge M. Nordh, Remarks on the Swedish Group Proceeding Act (June 2, 2005) 
at 1, available at http://www.courdecassation.fr/manifestations/colloques 
/Colloques2005/actions_collectives/judge_nordh.pdf.
59 Tommy Pettersson, et al., The Sweden  Report, at 4, DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR THE 
INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION LAW AS LAID DOWN IN ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/ 
private_enforcement/national_reports/sweden_en.pdf (citing lag (2002:599) om 
grupprattegang) (last visited on Feb. 5, 2007).
60 GROUP PROCEEDING FACT SHEET, SWEDEN, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Ju 02.10e 
(Dec. 2002) at 1, available at http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c4/34/47 
/6cd3ccdf.pdf (referring to the Swedish Group Proceedings Act (2002:599).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at Annex I, p. 21.
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the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency should be authorized to bring 
public class actions.68
SFS 2002:599, Section 8, of the Swedish Code of Statutes places the 
following limitations on group actions:
A group action may only be considered if:
(1) the action is founded on circumstances that are common 
or of a similar nature for the claims of the members of 
the group,
(2) group proceedings do not appear to be inappropriate 
owing to some claims of the members of the group, as 
regard grounds, differing substantially from other 
claims,
(3) the large part of the claims to which the action relates 
cannot equally well be pursued by personal actions by 
members of the group,
(4) the group, taking into consideration its size, ambit, and 
otherwise is appropriately defined, and
(5) the plaintiff, taking into consideration the plaintiff’s 
interest in the substantive matter, the plaintiff’s financial 
capacity to bring a group action and the circumstances 
generally, is appropriate to represent the members of the 
group in the case.69
The Swedish Class Action Act allows claimants to “opt in” to a group 
action in which the decision would bind all of the litigants in the group.70 This 
“opt in” system contrasts with the United States, which is an “opt out” 
system.71 In order to opt into a Swedish class action, class members must give 
written notice to the court, and only these members “will be allowed to 
participate in the proceedings as passive members of the class.”72 The failure 
to give written notice to the court within the time period dictated by the court 
                                                                
68 Id. at 1.
69 8 § Special Preconditions for Proceedings (Swedish Code of Statutes [SFS] 
2002:599).
70 Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 1.
71 Willett, supra note 1, at 4.
72 Pettersson et al., supra note 59, at 4.
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results in the individual’s withdrawal from the group.73 To initiate a class 
action, one must be an individual, legal person, organization, or authority with 
special permission from the government.74 Importantly, the Group Proceedings 
Act allows for damages, but only for various environmental damage claims.75
Additionally, plaintiffs may make an agreement with their attorney 
that the litigation fees shall be determined by the success of the case, but the 
agreement requires court approval in order to be asserted against the members 
of the group.76 Thus, a form of contingent fees exists, as “the attorney will 
receive a particularly high payment if the group wins the case and little or no 
payment if the group loses.”77 The court may also determine in advance the 
amount of compensation a lawyer should receive, if this is reasonable in light 
of the estimated time and work that will be involved.78 If the person 
representing the class settles, the court must approve the settlement for it to be 
valid for the whole class.79 In granting its approval, the court ascertains 
whether or not the settlement “discriminate[s] against particular members of 
the group or [is] in another way manifestly unfair.”80
Sweden adheres to the rule that the loser pays the costs of the 
proceedings and applies this rule to group actions as well.81 However, as the 
members of the group are not actual parties to the proceedings, they are not 
liable for the costs.82 This general rule does have some exceptions, but where 
members of the group do have to pay some costs, these costs shall “never 
exceed the sum accruing to them as a result of the proceedings.”83 An example 
of an exception would be if a member of the group increased the cost of 
litigation through “carelessness or oversight.”84 In such a situation, the 
member would have to pay the increased costs.85
As of the summer of 2005, very few actions had been filed in 
Sweden.86 At that time, the following three cases were pending: a suit by five 
                                                                
73 Swedish Code of Statutes, supra note 69, §14, at 4.
74 Pettersson et al., supra note 59, at 4.
75 Group Proceeding Fact Sheet, supra note 60, at 1.
76 Swedish Code of Statutes, supra note 69, § 38, at 8.  
77 Group Proceeding Fact Sheet, supra note 60, at 2.
78 Swedish Code of Statutes, supra note 69, § 30 at 6.  
79 Group Proceeding Fact Sheet, supra note 60, at 2.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Swedish Code of Statutes, supra note 69, §37.
85 Id.
86 Nordh, supra 58, at 5.
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hundred airline passengers against a travel agency, a suit brought by 
approximately 7,000 individuals against an electric company, and a suit 
involving only seven members and individual claims of around €20.87 The 
scarcity of pending suits illustrates that potential claimants are not utilizing the 
law of class actions in Sweden. Thus, while the law may closely resemble the 
United States, it is employed in far fewer cases.
V. THE NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands has a limited class action law in place.88 Class action 
claimants may pursue court orders, rescission of contracts, and refunds; 
however, they may not seek punitive damages.89
In the Netherlands, collective claims and representative actions may 
be filed by special-purpose associations.90 The groups must demonstrate they 
have defined and pursued a specific purpose. Article 3:305a CC states:
A foundation or association with full legal capacity can 
institute an action intended to protect similar interests of 
other persons to the extent that its articles promote such 
interests.... A legal person referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
have no locus standing if, in the given circumstances, it has 
not made a sufficient attempt to achieve the objective of the 
action through consultation with the defendant.91
Article 3:305a Section 3 CC limits a legal person from claiming 
damages by stating that the object of the action “may not be to seek monetary 
compensation.”92 Rather, the object may be to have an order against the 
defendant published, as determined by the court, and at the defendant’s 
expense.93 Plaintiffs will often institute joint actions to avoid these 3:305 
limitations.94 This is accomplished by either obtaining the same lawyer or “by 
                                                                
87  Id.
88 Allen, supra note 45, at 6.
89 Id.
90 Weyer VerLoren van Themaat, et al., The Netherlands Report, at 3, DAMAGES 
ACTIONS FOR THE INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION LAW AS LAID 
DOWN IN ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/national_re
ports/netherlands_en.pdf (last visited on Feb. 6, 2006).
91 Id. at 4.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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assignment of individual claims to a particular (legal) person.”95 Thus, the 
claims are “bundle[d]” and “joined procedurally.”96
As in the United States, the Dutch Parliament has made representative 
action settlements binding on all class members, with the exception of those 
who opt out.97 However, unlike the United States, the Netherlands banned 
lawyer advertising.98 This ban on advertising has resulted in consumer
advocacy organizations advertising class actions.99
One example of a legal foundation able to bring representative 
actions in court is “Stichting Regres en Verhaal Schade en Kosten 
Bouwfraude.”100 It was founded in June 2003 by several local municipalities 
and translates to the “Foundation for Recourse and Recovery of Damages and 
Costs resulting from Construction Fraud.”101 It is authorized to target 
construction and other companies for “bid-rigging.”102 By February 2004, the 
association had brought five cases to court as test cases.103
A 2004 report by the international firm Ashurst found that the 
Netherlands and Austria were the only countries in Europe with pending class 
action suits seeking damages.104 In June 2005, a damages verdict was granted 
in favor of fifteen women who brought a class action suit against Akzo Nobel, 
a Dutch chemical and drug company.105 The group alleged that the company 
had a misleading advertising campaign in which the drug Implanon was 
promoted as preventing conception when implanted in a woman’s arm.106 The 
women became pregnant due to their reliance on this ineffective 
contraceptive.107 Some of the women estimated their damages (the cost of 
raising an unwanted child) at €1 million.108 The court found the company 
                                                                
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Mark Wegener & Peter Fitzpatrick, Europe Gets Litigious, Class Actions and 
Competition Enforcement May Change Europe’s Legal Culture, LEGAL TIMES, Vol. 
XXVIII, No. 21, May 23, 2005, at 1.
98 Willett, supra note 1, at 15.
99 Id.
100 VerLoren van Themaat, et al., supra note 90, at 4.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Freedman, supra note 51, at 1.
105 Sherwood & Tait, supra note 18, at 6.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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negligent and the women entitled to damages, the amount of which was being 
reviewed.109
VI. SPAIN
The class action system in Spain is more limited than that of the 
United States.110 Spanish class actions are rooted in Article 11 of the Civil 
Procedure law.111 These class actions are “only available for the protection of 
the rights of consumers and end-users.”112 Other individuals who are affected 
need to bring individual claims.113 The types of losses covered by class actions 
are limited to physical and moral injury and economic loss.114
Generally, associations can sue to protect the rights and interests of 
the consumers and users they represent, as well as the associations’ rights and 
interests.115 Examples of associations that may bring class actions include: 
consumer and user associations, legally recognized groups designed to defend 
or protect consumers and users, and groups of impacted people where 
members of the group comprise at least half of the total number of affected 
persons.116 Where the number of people affected by the loss is unascertainable; 
those consumer associations that are recognized by the law as representing 
general consumer interests may bring a claim under the protection of intereses 
difusos (diffused interests).117
In order to bring a class action, the requirements of the Civil 
Procedure law (CPL) Article 11 must be met.118 Thus, associations formed by 
individuals other than consumers or end-users, such as the “defendant’s 
competitors, distributors or customers,” cannot bring an Article 11 class 
action.119 If these parties are injured, they must sue individually, but may grant 
a barrister power to represent them in a joint action.120 A judgment rendered in 
                                                                
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Ashurst, Discussions on Class Actions Across Europe (Dec. 2005).  
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2.
115 Jesus Almoguera, et al., The Spain Report, at 6, DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR 
THE INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION LAW AS LAID DOWN IN 
ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/national_re
ports/spain_en.pdf (citing Civil Procedure Law [hereinafter CPL] art.11.1). 
116 Id. (citing CPL art. 11.2, 11.3).  
117 Id. (citing CPL art. 11.2, 11.3).  
118 Id. at 6-7.
119 Id. at 7.
120 Id.
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this scenario will only bind the parties represented in that trial, rather than all 
parties who could have chosen to join the suit.121 A joint action occurs 
when several plaintiffs bring a set of claims with a common thread such that 
the judge joins the claims.122 One judgment may be made which applies to all 
the claims, but the claims are still treated individually, and awards are granted 
separately to each set of plaintiffs.123
The court does not grant awards to the group as a whole, but rather to 
each individual claimant.124 Thus, after the judgment, individuals must apply 
to the court “to be recognized as a member of the class or group” and “to 
quantify individual damages.”125 This process differs from class actions as 
recognized by the European Union Comparative Report.126 The amount the 
claimant is awarded should correspond with what they would have recovered 
if the claimant had brought the action individually.127 The Spanish law has no 
counterpart to punitive or exemplary damages.128 While consumer associations 
can bring damage actions, as of June 2005, no damage claims had been 
brought.129
Attorney fee arrangements in Spain do not resemble those of
surrounding countries. Contingency fees are prohibited in Spain.130 However, 
the client may award the lawyer a minimum fee based on the trial outcome.131
The employment of this type of fee arrangement depends solely on the 
agreement between the lawyer and the client rather than the type of action.132
The only other European country to adopt this approach is Austria.133
VII. ITALY
Italy does not have class actions, but rather has collective actions.134
Lawmakers are considering a bill to give consumers better redress under these 
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collective actions.135 The bill allows “consumer associations [identified by the 
law], professional associations and the chamber of commerce… [to] apply to 
the court… to obtain compensation of damages or the repayment of sums of 
money owed to individual consumers directly,” where the damage is a result 
of mass torts.136 These mass torts should be “in the context of contracts.... 
including those relating to consumers’ credit facilities, insurance and banking 
relationships, financial instruments, investment and savings management 
services, to the extent that these harm the rights of a plurality of 
consumers.”137
Under this bill, the lawsuit would proceed in two or three phases: the 
judgment or settlement, the dispute resolution mediation (which may be the 
last stage), and the enforcement of the judgment by individual consumers.138
The judges may award damages when they enter a judgment.139 This 
judgment should also include the judge’s criteria for awarding damages.140
Should the parties choose to settle, a judge will preside over the agreement.141
Following the judgment awarding damages or the settlement agreement, the 
parties join in a “non-contentious resolution” of the lawsuit.142 The parties’ 
attorneys shall be present and the meeting will be chaired by a professional 
mediator.143 “The dispute resolution chamber shall establish... the terms and 
amount for settling the individual consumer’s potential claim.”144 If the 
attorneys fail to come to a mediated agreement, the individual consumer may 
pursue the action in court, where the court will certify that the individual meets 
the criteria set forth in the judgment as well as the amount of damage 
compensation owed.145 Then, “the judgment shall be enforceable against the 
defendant.”146 The representative associations and chambers of commerce do 
not have standing in this latter proceeding.147
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This bill was not intended to resemble the United States’ style of 
class actions.148 Massimo Maggiore, an Ashurst attorney in Milan, says that 
this is because Italy hopes “to reap the benefits of [class actions] but... adjust it 
to a different system.”149 Rather, “the envisaged judicial tool is more akin to a 
representative action than to a proper class action.”150
In November of 2005, a class action suit against Sony was filed in 
both Italy and the United States. Electronic Frontiers Italy, an Italian digital 
rights group, requested that the Italian Government investigate Sony’s 
implementation of anti-piracy software.151 The software was designed to 
protect CDs from copyright but could make Windows computers more 
unreliable and slow them down.152 Sony was also accused of making it 
difficult to obtain the software that could uninstall the program, XCP.153
VIII. GERMANY
2005 also brought collective claim advancements in Germany. On 
November 1, 2005, Germany’s Capital Investors Model Proceedings Act 
(CIMPA), also known as “KapMuG” 
(KapitalanlegerMusterverfahrensgesestz), came into effect.154 Until now, 
Germany has never had a collective action comparable to a United States class 
action.155 However, rather than emulate the United States class action, 
Germany pioneered a new way of forming collective actions within the 
established framework of German civil procedure.156 The Federal Ministry of
Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection indicates that KapMuG creates an 
instrument which “enables the enforcement of similar claims in the interest of 
process economy and the saving of judicial resources dispensing with the 
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disadvantages of the US-American class action, i.e. contingency fees and an 
alliance of the injured parties which is debatable under constitutional law.”157
The KapMuG was created for specific types of disputes under the 
Capital Markets law.158 The legislature’s primary aim was to reduce 
procedural difficulties inherent in situations where large numbers of investors 
file claims against a single defendant as was seen in Frankfurt with the 
Deutshe Telekom case.159 In Deutshe Telekom, fifteen thousand investors 
sought compensation for the company’s misleading statements by filing over 
2,100 German lawsuits.160 The case may take up to ten years to litigate.161
Lawmakers hope the sort of judicial entanglement that was seen in Deutshe 
Telekom can be avoided under the KapMug.
The law does not apply to other civil lawsuits, such as product 
liability cases.162 Rather, “the law applies to proceedings at the first instance, 
in which
(1) a claim for compensation of damages due to false, 
misleading or omitted public capital markets 
information or
(2) a claim to fulfillment of contract, which is based on an 
offer under the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act 
[SATA], is asserted.”163
Ashurst attorneys Karl Wach and Konrad Kern speculate that 
KapMuG will potentially impact “all issuers of securities, offerors of other 
investments, investment banks, members of their management or advisory 
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boards and persons otherwise responsible for a prospectus, as well as for 
bidders as defined in SATA.”164
The model proceeding develops in several stages.165 The process 
begins with the “commencement of the action.”166 At this stage, individuals 
must file their own separate actions.167 Now, “the court at the seat of the issuer 
has exclusive jurisdiction over all cases falling under CIMPA.”168
The second stage is the model proceeding application.169 Either party 
may apply for the court’s establishment of a model case.170 In the application, 
a party may attempt to establish the existence or nonexistence of various 
conditions that would either justify or eliminate a potential claim.171 The 
application may also be used to have specific legal questions addressed by a 
higher court.172 The new electronic Complaint Registry logs the applications 
on the Internet so that the public can access them.173
The model proceedings form the third stage of the suit.174 If ten 
claims referring to a similar matter accumulate in the registry during a four-
month period, the Higher Regional Court will take over jurisdiction of the 
model proceeding.175 The court will select one of the claimants to file a 
separate claim, and that claimant will serve as the model for the 
proceedings.176 The court that previously had jurisdiction over the model 
claimant’s case now has exclusive jurisdiction over all the cases filed under 
the model proceeding.177 The Higher Regional Court tries the model 
claimant’s case through the model proceeding and the other claimants may 
participate and comment in these proceedings.178 All pending proceedings 
where the decision is contingent upon the outcome of the model case are 
suspended until the court issues a judgment in the model case.179
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Judgment on the model claim is the last stage of the proceedings.180
Once the Higher Regional Court issues its judgment, the judgment binds all 
similar claims filed up until the date of the court’s decision.181 After the 
judgment, the individual proceedings of each claimant are determined by the 
lower court on their specific facts and points of law that did not relate the 
model proceeding.182 The court trying the other claimants will rule based on 
the precedent set in the model proceeding.183
The model proceeding can be settled, but all parties to the claims 
must agree.184 Claimants seeking model proceedings do not incur any 
additional court fees and, in fact, the normal advance payments of certain court 
fees are suspended.185
The Ministry of Justice claims the Act offers several advantages.186 It 
notes that the Complaint Registry allows investors to monitor claims and 
determine whether any proceedings relate to their own claims.187 Additionally, 
the site may motivate the investors to file a claim themselves as model 
proceedings spread the cost of the case over all claimants.188 Also, those who 
issue securities or offer other investments can view the site for a timely 
clarification of various legal issues.189 Further, the compilation of the claims 
provides the court with a consistent standard with which to rule, while 
reducing the overall burden on the judicial system.190
However, the new Act may have negative consequences for 
businesses.191 The reform will probably increase the number of investor claims 
overall.192 Specifically, the Complaint Registry will enable greater publicity of 
claims and encourage other similarly situated individuals to join the case.193
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This further complicates the case and would probably increase both the length 
of the trial and the financial vulnerability of the defendant.194
The legislature attempted to reduce these potentially negative 
consequences for businesses by avoiding a variety of features characteristic of 
US class actions.195 For instance, unnamed or unknown plaintiffs may not be 
represented because model proceedings require individuals to initiate the 
proceedings themselves.196 Germany has the “loser pays” rule and this rule 
applies to model proceedings.197 Additionally, Germany does not have 
contingent fees or punitive damages, and each individual claimant must prove 
any compensatory damages.198 These rules should help to dissuade any 
frivolous plaintiffs’ suits. 
For the next five years, the legislature will monitor the effects of the 
model proceedings.199 The Act has a “sunset clause,” which automatically 
discontinues the Act on November 1, 2010.200 Should the legislature find the 
Act successful, it can prolong the act or broaden its scope at that time.201
IX. FRANCE
Current French law does not have an equivalent to US style class 
action suits.202 However, certain associations can bring a suit representing 
several individual interests (“action en representation conjointe”) or collective 
interests.203 In order to bring an “action en representation conjointe,” the 
association must have an explicit mandate from the individual members 
allowing representation before the association can represent their interests.204
The association cannot use the press to publicly ask for the mandate.205 In 
regard to collective interest actions, the Administrative Supreme Court, known 
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as the “Conseil d’Etat,” has allowed associations to bring actions to defend 
either the association’s interests or the collective interests of those they 
represent.206 Associations do not need authorization for these suits.207
In another type of action, the public prosecutor, the Minister for 
Economic Affairs, or the chairman of the Competition Council can sue for 
damages on behalf of individuals, but this action is limited to damages arising 
from restrictive practices.208
In 1994, the French legislature passed a law allowing shareholders to 
bind together to sue in associations.209 A minority shareholder is permitted to 
bring action against a majority shareholder, but the company receives any 
damages awarded.210 An example of this occurred when “Orange minority 
shareholders challenged the fairness of the price offered in a buyout by 
majority shareholder France Telecom.”211
In January 2005, French President Jacques Chirac proposed that 
France strengthen consumer rights by developing US style class actions.212
The announcement surprised many in the legal community and has evoked 
great controversy.213 The Paris Bar Association and consumer groups support 
Chirac’s proposal.214 The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the 
office of Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, and Medef (an organization 
representing the interests of French businesses) all oppose initiatives for 
French class actions.215 Each of these parties believes that the introduction of 
class actions would harm French business, particularly the financial sector.216
Thomas Donohue, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, 
visited Paris in January 2005 and made statements warning France to avoid US
style class actions.217 He asserted that their introduction would “damage the 
economy and shift money from ‘good companies to lawyers.’”218 The 
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president of Medef, Ernest-Antoine Seillie’re, hosted Donohue during his visit 
and supported his stance, claiming that class actions could have “catastrophic 
consequences” in France.219
President Chirac’s class action review task force issued its report 
regarding the matter on December 16, 2005.220 The report was open for 
consultation until March 1, 2006.221 At the conclusion of this period, the 
French Government will issue a proposal.222 The December 16th, 2005 
proposal attempted to balance “the need to protect the consumer” with the 
“competitiveness of undertaking,” as well as adhere to the principles of French 
law.223 The report outlined the status of group action in a variety of other 
countries, provided a summary of current French law as it relates to the issue, 
and set forth two possible class action models, one of which is inspired by 
United States and Quebec class actions.224 Some French lawyers feared that if 
Chirac’s proposal was passed, it would require further US style reforms such 
as adjusted disclosure and discovery rules as well as relaxation on legal 
advertising rules in order to be effective.225
French business groups have drawn assistance from US and Canadian 
defense lawyers and businesses to lobby for class actions to be limited to only 
those plaintiffs who actively join the class. This differs from US style class 
actions where once a judge certifies a securities class action lawsuit, the 
judgment applies to all investors, with the exception of those that opt out.226
The existence of a French contingency fee may be one of the reasons 
that French plaintiffs’ attorneys desire to import class actions. Many 
prominent Paris firms use contingency fees and are permitted to use the result 
of the suit as part of the fee basis.227 Also, while France does not adhere to a 
loser pays rule, French judges do have the discretion to order the loser to pay a 
portion of the prevailing party’s trial fees.228
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Though group actions are not currently permitted in France, some 
lawyers in Paris have formed a collective legal action website called 
classaction.fr.229 The site allows users to pay as little as €12 to register for a 
lawsuit,230 but the site is entitled to 40% of any damages.231 Thus far, the 
creator of the site, Jean-Marc Goldnadel claims he has “gather[ed] over 700 
individuals in a potential suit against Universal Pictures, Warner Brothers, and 
Columbia Tri-star” regarding a copy-protected DVD.232 The website 
speculates that the claimants should receive awards up to €1,000.233 The 
website has come under fire, as there have been allegations of ethical breaches 
and a suit to shut the website down.234 Goldnadel also won a suit against 
Medef, but had to remove the advertising from the site.235
As of December 2005, the site was defending against a new suit by 
UFC-Que Choisir, a French consumer group and supporter of class actions.236
The group claims that the site illegally recruits claimants and does not give the 
claimant sufficient control in settlement decisions.237 In addition, French class 
action adversaries also oppose the site and use it as an example of the kinds of 
problems that US style lawsuits entail, “ambulance-chasing lawyers, ruinous 
damages awards and spurious lawsuits used to blackmail companies into 
settlement.”238
X. CONCLUSION
As class actions have expanded in Europe, the debate surrounding 
this legal apparatus continues on a global scale. Critics note that when there is 
a lack of common interest between the class members, a class action fails to 
provide the class members and defendants with “individualized determination 
of their disputes.”239 Additionally, critics feel class actions give plaintiffs an 
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unfair advantage when bargaining by increasing defendant’s risk of 
damages.240 One writer summarized other criticisms as follows:
(1) Damage class actions are solely the creatures of class 
action attorneys’ entrepreneurial incentives.
(2) It is easy to detect non-meritorious class actions and 
most suits are non-meritorious.
(3) The benefits of class actions accrue primarily to lawyers 
who bring them.
(4) Transaction costs far outweigh benefits to the class and 
society.
(5) Existing rules are not adequate to insure that class 
actions serve their public goals.241
On the contrary, advocates for class actions highlight their positive 
attributes.242 Class actions lessen the burden on the courts and the economy by 
bundling cases that would otherwise require trying the cases separately.243
Additionally, resolving multiple yet related claims in a single trial provides a 
“consistency and finality” that is important for both efficiency and public 
confidence in the judiciary.244
Class actions balance the sometimes overwhelming differential 
between a large corporation and a small plaintiff. Plaintiffs with small claims 
often do not have enough incentive to bring a suit to redress legitimate wrongs, 
as the cost or hassle of the suit can exceed the damages. However, by bundling 
the claims, plaintiffs increase their leverage, which in turns provides 
opportunities where one did not exist previously.
Empowering the plaintiffs could lead to greater corporate 
responsibility. By punishing them through large settlements, the courts are 
speaking a language that businesses understand: money. If enough financial 
disincentive for ethical shortcuts and unsafe products are created, then we may 
actually see some real changes in businesses worldwide.
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Some commentators have speculated that the increase of class action 
legislation among European nations could lead to a uniform European law on 
class actions.245 In 2002, the European Commission appointed Lovells to study 
the product liability laws and their application in the European Union and to 
consider the possibility of reform.246 One suggested reform was the 
introduction of product liability class or representative actions.247 The study 
also suggested “greater harmonization in the EU of product liability laws 
under the directive.”248 The directive had already instituted measures to 
achieve this harmonization, such as a no-fault liability system.249 The Lovell 
study found the directive generally accepted as a product liability feature in the 
European Union.250 Overall, the Lovell study concluded that there was no need 
for directive reform at that point.251 The broad acceptance of the directive in 
European Union countries helped to partly form the basis of this conclusion.252
More recently, the European Commission requested that Ashurst 
conduct a similar study.253 The study was published in 2005.254 The study 
examined the “conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC 
antitrust rules.”255 Partial motivation for the study was the “well-established” 
finding that “private enforcement of the EC competition rules is lagging 
behind public enforcement.”256 The Ashurst study served as empirical support 
for the European Commission Green Paper on the topic.257 Nicholas Bessot, 
attorney for Ashurst Paris and co-author of the French Report for the study, 
notes that the Green Paper issued by the European Commission concludes that 
one possibility for addressing private enforcement of competition laws could 
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include the introduction or development of “class/group/collective actions in 
EU Member States.”258
Marc Gottridge, a securities lawyer for Lovells, doubts that such a 
change will occur in the near future, in part because the European Commission 
has yet to finish uniting the European securities laws.259 He also asserts that 
even if all the class action initiatives in Europe pass, plaintiffs such as 
institutional investors will still prefer bringing class actions in US courts due 
to the more favorable rules of “pre-trial evidence gathering, jury trials, and 
punitive damage awards.”260 Additionally, Gottridge doubts that Europe will 
abandon its traditional stances on loser pays rules and the prohibition of 
contingency fees, both of which also make the United States a more favorable 
plaintiff’s forum.261
The next few years will reveal whether or not Europe pursues a 
uniform policy on class actions. Some feel that this could hinge on the 
acceptance of the French class action. However, regardless of whether Europe 
decides to implement a unifying policy, now is an exciting time for class 
actions in Europe. The differing approaches taken by countries such as the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, and potentially France, will provide 
ample opportunity for the study of the strength and weakness of collective 
actions as applied in a variety of ways.
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